The lawyers at Bruder Springstead LLP bring backgrounds with a diverse range of advocacy experience. We have successfully appeared at all levels of trial and appellate court, as well as at a number of Ontario’s administrative tribunals. We are proud to share some of the noteworthy contributions our lawyers have made to the advancement and development of the law.
This action arose out of sexual abuse committed by a Roman Catholic priest in Newfoundland. At the Supreme Court of Canada, Krista Springstead was involved in advancing the novel legal argument that unincorporated associations were sueable entities in law.
Louis P. Covens was successful in dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal of the Summary Judgment Decision in Salman v. Ipacs, 2018 ONSC 4803.
Louis P. Covens on behalf of the respondent, The Personal Insurance Company, successfully argued the dismissal of this appeal with costs. The appellant sought to withdraw an admission made during a Summary Judgment motion in 2017 ONCSC 4232 to argue vicarious liability. The Court held that it was not in the interests of justice to allow the appeal based on the factors set out by the motion judge including the fact that one of the named Plaintiff’s would be prejudiced by the dismissal of a respondent, an insurer, whom was named pursuant to uninsured/underinsured provisions.
Shannon Mulholland acted as co-counsel on behalf of the Respondent. The plaintiff sought unobstructed use of an unopened road allowance abutting his home. The insured had passed a by-law restricting use of motor vehicles on unopened road allowances. The claim was defeated at trial and upheld on appeal.
Acting on behalf of the Respondent, Louis Covens challenged an Appeal by Allstate on whether an exclusion clause for coverage, found in most home owner policies, should apply. The Court held that the Respondent was not entitled to coverage for a counterclaim being advanced against her because the claim was “arising from” bodily injury to a person residing in her household.
In this seminal case examining the authority of an insurance broker to act as an agent for an insurer, Krista Springstead was involved in defending the insurer and successfully arguing that the insurer was not liable for the acts of a fraudulent broker holding himself out to be an agent of the insurer.
Catherine Bruder, on behalf of the respondent insurer, argued successfully to have the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal dismissed in this series of class actions and argued the related appeal of the costs award.
Krista Springstead successfully argued a motion for security for costs requiring the plaintiff to post $100,000 into the Court. Although the Master’s ruling was overturned by the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal upheld the Master’s decision.
This solicitor’s negligence/breach of fiduciary duty action arose out of a series of complex commercial transactions. Acting on behalf of the defendant lawyer and law firm, Krista Springstead was involved in the successful appeal of a $9 million judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal directed that a new trial should be held, at which the plaintiff’s action was ultimately dismissed.
This decision, in which Krista Springstead acted as counsel for the defendants, has become one of the leading Ontario Court of Appeal decisions on issue estoppel and res judicata.
Krystal Leonov was successful in dismissing the Plaintiff’s motion to revive her Action that had already been dismissed by Summary Judgment and upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Louis P. Covens was successful again on Summary Judgment in dismissing the Plaintiff’s conspiracy theory-type of claim. In his 27 page decision, Justice Stribopoulos found that neither of the Defendants participated in any nefarious activities and his Honour concluded that there was no genuine issue or evidentiary foundation for the torts of fraud and conspiracy as pleaded by the Plaintiff.
Louis P. Covens was successful on Summary Judgment in dismissing the Plaintiff’s Solicitor’s Negligence Action. The Plaintiff predominantly alleged she was coerced into an improvident settlement by her former solicitor. The Court accepted Mr. Covens’ submissions that there was no genuine issue for trial based on the evidentiary record that included Affidavits from the defendant solicitor and an expert opining on standard of care. The Court adopted the ‘reasonably competent solicitor’ test in dismissing the Plaintiff’s Action along with policy considerations to discourage suits and encourage settlements.
Louis P. Covens was successful on Summary Judgment in dismissing a solicitor’s negligence claim as against his client with costs in the amount of $42,000. The Court accepted his submissions that his clients’ advice to the Plaintiff fell squarely within the range of reasonable legal advice. As well, the Court accepted that Mr. Covens’ client did not cause the alleged loss of improvident settlement on the basis the settlement was rescinded for unrelated reasons. The Plaintiff was free to litigate his accident benefits claim as if he was in the same position before the alleged improvident settlement occurred.
Louis P. Covens was successful on Summary Judgment and obtained a Judgment dismissing his client with costs in the amount of $50,569.30. The Court accepted Mr. Covens’ argument that the Defendant, Pearce, whom was the registered owner of the truck in question, was the owner. The Court accepted that Pearce had a measure of control and possession. Her initial and continued registration of the truck in her name was deliberately done to maintain control of the truck. As a result of this and other findings and that Pearce’s policy of insurance would apply, Mr. Covens’ client, The Personal was no longer a necessary defendant.
Louis P. Covens was successful on Summary Judgment in having a Solicitor’s Negligence Action against his clients dismissed. The Court accepted Mr. Covens’ submissions that despite an alleged error by his clients, they did not cause the Plaintiff’s loss. The Court applied the ‘But For’ test which continues the longstanding jurisprudence on causation against solicitors. This case stands as a caution to successor solicitors whom cannot simply litigate against their predecessor for any loss and must prove causation.
This action, in which the plaintiff made allegations of faulty equipment against the defendant scuba diving facility, involved a diving fatality. At the commencement of the jury trial, Krista Springstead, acting for the scuba diving facility, was successful in having the action against her client dismissed.
Catherine Bruder was involved on behalf of the defendant in this third party claim against the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff passenger was injured. The defendant was successful in obtaining, as against the third party, a judgment for 35% of the plaintiff’s damages.
Catherine Bruder was successfully involved in the defeat of this motion for summary judgment. The court agreed that there was evidence that was capable of supporting an inference that the defendant’s negligence caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Argued by Krista Springstead, this is a leading case setting out the relevant factors to be examined by the court when a party seeks a change of venue.
Acting on behalf of the Defendant, Louis Covens was successful at trial in having the Plaintiff’s Claim dismissed with costs. The Plaintiff argued that following a purchase of an investment property from the Defendant, the Defendant had misrepresented the property and failed to disclose a latent defect. The Court held that the Defendant made no such misrepresentation and was unaware of any latent defect.
This hearing was held concurrently with 17-001057/AABS v Yarmouth Mutual Fire, 2017 CanLII 146609 (ON LAT).
Shannon Mulholland successfully argued all four issues in dispute for each applicant on behalf of the insurer.
The respondent denied claims for social worker support on the basis of duplication. It was held that the insurer is not obliged to pay for treatment plans that have the same goals and methods.
The respondent denied treatment plans for in-home occupational therapy assessments. The applicants did not meet the onus of proof in demonstrating that the disputed assessment plans were reasonable and necessary, in particular with respect to the goals of overcoming at-home barriers to maximum medical recovery.
The LAT agreed with the respondent that the insurer is not mandated by law to pay mileage pursuant to Bulletin No. A-14/14, even where the insurer is paying for the provider’s travel time.
The applicants’ requests for interest were also denied.
Shannon Mulholland successfully argued all three issues in dispute. The LAT agreed with the respondent’s argument that its defective notice was “cured” by a subsequent denial.
Shannon successfully distinguished the seminal case of General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada v. Violi in this case where the goals of pain relief and improvement in the applicant’s medical condition were not being met with continued passive treatment. The LAT agreed that an insurer is not required to continue to fund passive treatment that is not established as effective.
The applicant’s request for interest was denied.
Louis Covens, on behalf of the Insurer, successfully argued a favourable expense award following the Applicant’s late withdrawal of his Application for Arbitration.
At the initial arbitration, Krista Springstead successfully argued for the denial of the applicant’s request for Income Replacement Benefits. The applicant appealed, arguing that she was denied a fair hearing arising out of bias and the incompetence of her counsel. Krista, acting for the insurer, successfully argued that the appellant had received a fair hearing before the arbitrator, and the applicant’s appeal was dismissed.
At arbitration, Krista Springstead successfully argued that the applicant’s request for Income Replacement Benefits should be denied and that the applicant should be required to pay her client’s expenses of arbitration.
Catherine Bruder, on behalf of the applicants, successfully obtained a ruling that the respondent/plaintiff’s right to sue the applicants was taken away by section 31 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 because the respondent/plaintiff was a worker for a Schedule 1 employer in the course of his employment at the time of his motor vehicle accident.